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Does a Judge's Party of Appointment or Gender Matter to Case
outcomes?: An Empirical Study of the Court of Appeal for Ontario
Abstract

A recent study by Cass Sunstein identified ideological differences in the votes cast by judges on the United
States Courts of Appeals in certain types of cases. He found that these patterns varied depending on the
ideology of an appellate judge's co-panelists. In this study, we undertake a similar examination of the busiest
appellate court in Canada, the Court of Appeal for Ontario. This study collects data on the votes cast by
individual judges in every reported decision between 1990 and 2003. Each case was cod6d by type, for
example "criminal law," "constitutional law," or "private law." In addition, the votes cast by individual judges in
each category were tracked based on variables such as the type of litigant, the political party that appointed the
judge, and the judge's gender. This study reveals that at least in certain categories of cases, both party of
appointment and gender are statistically significant in explaining case outcomes. Between these two variables,
gender actually appears to be the stronger determinant of outcome in certain types of cases. While these
findings are cause for concern, this study also points toward a simple solution. Diversity in the composition of
appeal panels both from the standpoint of gender and party of appointment dampened the statistical
influence of either variable. In other words, in the case of gender, a single judge on a panel who is of the
opposite sex from the others, or in the case of political party, a single judge appointed by a different political
party, is sufficient to eliminate the potential distorting influence of either variable. This finding suggests a need
to reform how appeal panels are currently assembled in order to ensure political and gender diversity and
minimize concerns about the potential for bias.
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DOES A JUDGE'S PARTY OF
APPOINTMENT OR GENDER
MATTER TO CASE OUTCOMES?:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO©
JAMES STRIBOPOULOS & MOIN A. YAHYA"
A recent siudy by Cass Sunstein identified
ideological differences in the votes cast by judges on
the United States Courts of Appeals in certain types of
cases. He found that these patterns varied depending
on the ideology of an appellate judge's co-panelists. In
this study, we undertake a similar examination of the
busiest appellate court in Canada, the Court of Appeal
for Ontario. This study collects data on the votes cast
by individual judges in every reported decision
between 1990 and 2003. Each case was cod6d by type,
for example "criminal law," "constitutional law," or
"private law." In addition, the votes cast by individual
judges in each category were tracked based on
variables such as the type of litigant, the political party
that appointed the judge, and the judge's gender.
This study reveals that at least in certain
categories of cases, both party of appointment and
gender are statistically significant in explaining case
outcomes. Between these two variables, gender
actually appears to be the stronger determinant of

Derni~rement, une 6tude de Cass Sunstein a mis
Ic doigt sur les diff6rences id6ologiques des votes
exprim6es par les juges des cours d'appel am6ricaines
dans certains genres de cas. Cass Sunstein a constat6
que les tendances variaient selon l'id6ologie des co-.
magistrats du juge de cour d'appel. Dans cette 6tude,
nous entreprenons un examen analogue de la cour
d'appel la plus sollicit6e du Canada, A savoir, la Cour
d'appel de l'Ontario. L'6tude recueille des donn6es sur
les votes de chaque juge dans chaque d6cision
rapportde entre 1990 et 2003. Chaque affaire avait 6t6
cod6e selon son genre, par exemple: vdroit penal,,
,,droit constitutionnelv ou ,edroit priv6., En outre, les
votes de chaque juge dans chaque cat6gorie 6taient
enregistrds en fonction de certaines variables: genre de
plaideur, parti politique qui a nomm6 le juge, sexe du
magistrat.
Cette 6tude rdv le que dans certaines cat6gories
de cas au moins, le sexe du magistrat et le parti
politique ayant nomm6 ce magistrat 6taient
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outcome in certain types of cases. While these findings
are cause for concern, this study also points toward a
simple solution. Diversity in the composition of appeal
panels both from the standpoint of gender and party of
appointment dampened the statistical influence of
either variable. In other words, in the case of gender, a
single judge on a panel who is of the opposite sex from
the others, or in the case of political party, a single
judge appointed by a different political party, is
sufficient to eliminate the potential distorting
influence of either variable. This finding suggests a
need to reform how appeal panels are currently
assembled in order to ensure political and gender
diversity and minimize concerns about the potential
for bias.
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significatifs du point de vue statistique pour expliquer
l'issue dans certains types de cas. Entre ces deux
variables, le sexe du magistrat semble effectivement
6tre le determinant le plus fort de Iissue de certaines
esp~ces de cas. Tandis que ces constatations sont des
motifs de pr6occupation, cette 6tude montre
6galement la voie d'une solution simple. La diversit6
dans la composition des chambres des magistrats des
Cours d'appel, A la fois du point de vue du sexe et du
parti responsable des nominations, amenuisait
linfluence statistique tant d'une variable que de
I'autre. En d'autres termes, dans le cas du sexe, un seul
juge dans une chambre, qui est du sexe oppos6 de celui
des autres,ou dans le cas du parti politique, un seul
juge nomm par un parti politique diff6rent, suffit i
supprimer la possibilit6 d'une influence d6formante
d'une variable comme de I'autre. Cette constatation
porte sugg6rer un besoin de r6former la fagon dont
les chambres d'appel sont actuellement constitu6es,
afin d'assurer une diversit6 politique et sexuelle, et ainsi
minimiser le souci d'une possibilitd d'un parti pris.
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The judicial oath of office imposes on the judge a lofty duty of impartiality. But
impartiality is not easy of attainment. For a judge does not shed the attributes of
common humanity when he assumes the ermine. The ordinary human mind is a mass of
prepossessions inherited and acquired, often none the less dangerous because
unrecognized by their possessor. Few minds are as neutral as a sheet of plate glass, and
indeed a mind of that quality may actually fail in judicial efficiency, for the warmer tints
of imagination and sympathy are needed to temper the cold light of reason if human
justice is to be done.'
-

I.

Lord MacMillan

INTRODUCTION

At least formally, our legal system is prefaced on the notion that
the personal characteristics of individual judges-for example, a judge's
political views or gender-are not relevant to how cases are decided.
This assumption is fundamental. The legitimacy of our legal system
depends very much on the idea of impartial justice-the notion that who
the judge is should not affect what is decided.' Nevertheless, lawyers
who regularly litigate cases before our courts would undoubtedly
question the correctness of this assumption. Most telling are the first
questions that they invariably ask one another about the cases they are
litigating, either at trial or on appeal: "who is your judge?" or "who is on
your panel?" Are such questions indicative of some empirically
verifiable truth about judges, or are they simply an artifact of litigation
bias?3 This study attempts to answer that question.
In this study, we empirically evaluate whether subjective
characteristics such as the party that appointed a judge or a judge's

Rt. Hon. Lord MacMillan G.C.V.O., LL.D., Law & Other Things, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1938) at 217.
2 See e.g. Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 259 at 287-88, wherein the
Court refers to impartiality as a "well-settled, foundational principle" (at 287) and indicates that it
is the "key to our judicial process, and must be presumed" (at 288). See also R. v. S(R.D.), [1997] 3
S.C.R. 484 at 532-34.
' A lawyer could blame a loss, or many losses, rather unjustifiably, on the fact that a
particular judge was presiding; this might allow the lawyer to avoid the discomfort of taking the
blame for either mishandling the case and/or overestimating its strength. More generally, optimism
bias on the part of those involved in litigation is a well-documented phenomenon. See George
Loewenstein et a., "Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining" (1993) 22 J.
Legal Stud. 135; Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, "Psychological Principles in Negotiating Civil
Settlements" (1999) 4 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 1 at 12-19; Robert H. Mnookin, "Why Negotiations
Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the Resolution of Conflict" (1993) 8 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol.
235 at 243-46; and Steven Shavell, Foundationsof EconomicAnalysis of Law (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2004) at 405.
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gender matter to case outcomes on appeal. This study is modelled on
the work of Cass Sunstein, David Schkade, and Lisa Michelle Ellman in
the United States.4 We employ the same methodology to analyze the
voting behaviour of the judges of the Court of Appeal for Ontario,
Canada's busiest provincial appellate court. This study involves an
analysis of every reported decision issued by that court between 1990
and 2003, amounting to over 4,000 cases involving 12,000 distinct
observations of individual judges' votes.' Our analysis reveals a number
of noteworthy findings.
First, there is an extraordinarily high rate of unanimity in the
court's judgments: 95%. It is just as interesting that this rate varies
substantially in different categories of cases. For example, in narcotics
cases it increases to 99%, whereas in sexual assault cases it decreases to
93%. We offer potential explanations for these variations by examining
variables, such as differences in voting patterns between male and
female judges in sexual assault cases.
Second, our analysis reveals that in certain categories of cases,
there is a statistically significant variation in the voting of judges
depending on the party of their appointment. The degree of this
variation fluctuates from one case category to another, while in many
categories there is virtually no difference at all. However, in certain
types of cases, such as criminal cases where Charter6 remedies were
sought, the differences are dramatic, with appointees of Conservative 7
government favouring more conservative outcomes and appointees of
Liberal government preferring more liberal outcomes, although in a
more nuanced fashion. The influence of political ideology is dampened

4
Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, "Ideological Voting on Federal
Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation" (2004) 90 Va. L. Rev. 301.

' We used the Ontario Appeal Cases (O.A.C.), published by Maritime Law Book, as our
source. We appreciate that this reporter does not contain many of the court's decisions that take the
form of "endorsements." Historically, "endorsements" were simply the written entry of the court on
the back of an Appeal Book. As a result, such "decisions" were very brief, not very accessible, and
accordingly given little weight as precedents. In recent years, especially with the advent of Quicklaw's
online database of decisions, most endorsements are now available in an electronic format. This study
does not extend to endorsements. This is because many endorsements, especially from the early period
of this study, are so brief that they provide insufficient detail to be included.
6 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 being
Schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982(U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].

' References to the "Conservative" party/government in this study refer to the Progressive
Conservative party/government.
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in panels made up of appointees of Conservative and Liberal
governments, and it is accentuated in panels made up of appointees of a
single party. This finding calls into question the assumption that our
judiciary is apolitical in its decision-making, and it points to a need to be
more conscious about how appeal court panels are assembled.
Third, and equally notable, is the variation we found in the way
male and female judges vote. Although in. many categories there is no
discernible difference in their voting patterns, in some categories,
gender appears to matter greatly. For example, in criminal cases
involving sexual or domestic violence, as well as in family law cases
involving disputes about custody or support, there is a statistically
significant tendency on the part of female judges to favour the interests
of complainants and mothers. The converse of male judges voting in
favour of the interests of accused persons and fathers is also true. Again,
these effects are dampened on panels that include judges of both
genders. These findings signal a need for greater gender diversity on
appellate court panels, especially in cases where polarization of the
genders is more likely.
It is well worth knowing how individual judges fit into this
general dynamic. The parliamentary committee that recently reviewed
the appointments of Justice Abella and Justice Charron to the Supreme
Court of Canada might have been interested in knowing whether either
of these judges stood out in their judging, in a statistically measurable
way. In a more transparent appointments process, the responsible
committee could use this sort of data to query why a nominee has
distinguished herself in a certain way. For example, did Justice Abella
lead the other judges when gender issues were involved because she is
perceived as an expert in this area and her colleagues therefore found
her views persuasive in these cases? Or, alternatively, was she simply
more "activist" on gender issues (as some claimed at the time of her
nomination),8 which, with the culture of consensus-remembering the

8

See Robert Matas, "New Judges Expected To Maintain Continuity" The Globe and Mail

(25 August 2004) A7. It may be that when it comes to equality issues at least, Justice Abella might
very well be prepared to admit and even defend her perceived activism. Long before she was a
nominee for the Supreme Court of Canada, she quite frankly acknowledged that "[e]very
decisionmaker who walks into a courtroom to hear a case is armed not only with the relevant legal
texts, but with a set of values, experiences and assumptions that are thoroughly embedded." See
Rosalie S. Abella, "The Dynamic Nature of Equality" in Shelia L. Martin & Kathleen E. Mahoney,
eds., Equality andJudicialNeutrality(Toronto:Carswell, 1987) 3 at 8-9.
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•95% unanimity rate-resulted in her colleagues deferring to her
judgment for the sake of collegiality? Our data cannot answer these
sorts of normative questions; they do, however, provide a strong
empirical justification for beginning to ask them. All of the foregoing
suggests a need for further research in this area and for greater
transparency in the judicial appointments process in Canada, so that
there will at least be a public forum for seeking answers to these
important questions.
II.

THE CURRENT STUDY IN CONTEXT

Empirical studies of the judicial process began in the United
States with the groundbreaking work of Glendon Schubert, a political
scientist.9 By modifying a technique first developed by social
psychologists, Schubert applied a methodology known as "cumulative
scaling" to the voting behaviour of judges of the U.S. Supreme Court.
By "scaling"" the votes of individual judges in selected categories of
cases, Schubert was able to reveal the attitudinal commitments of
individual judges in such cases. The object of his studies was to show the
extent to which the public acts of judges are influenced by their personal
beliefs." This work ultimately opened up an entire sub-discipline within
political science that continues to this day. 2
Canadian scholars quickly followed. In the late 1960s, Sidney
Peck applied scalogram analysis13 to the decisions of the Supreme Court
of Canada. He used this methodology to reveal the strength of the policy
commitments of individual judges in a variety of different case
categories, including taxation, negligence, criminal law, labour relations,

' See Glendon A. Schubert, "The Study of Judicial Decision-Making as an Aspect of
Political Behaviour" (1958) 52 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1007; Glendon A. Schubert, QuantitativeAnalysis
of JudicialBehaviour (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959); and Glendon Schubert, The JudicialMind:
The Attitudes and Ideologies of Supreme Court Justices 1946-1963 (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1965) [Schubert, The JudicialMin].

'0This method consists of plotting the voting of individual judges on a graph and placing
the judge's voting against a measurable scale so that patterns in the judge's voting can be observed.

"Schubert, The JudicialMind, supra note 9 at 15.
2For an excellent review of the evolution of this area of research in the United States, see
Thaddeus Hwong, "A Review of Quantitative Studies of Decision Making in the Supreme Court of
Canada" (2003) 30 Man. L.J. 353 at 354-59.
' 3 Another term used to describe "scaling." See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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federalism, and civil liberties. 4 Not surprisingly, Peck found that many
of the judges voted consistently in favour of their personal policy
preferences, for example, routinely preferring the interests of the Crown
in criminal cases, or management in labour disputes. Within the legal
academy, however, there was much doubt regarding the utility of this
kind of empirical research. 5
A short while ago, the dominant view among legal scholars was
that the law reports alone provided a representative account of what was
taking place in the courts.' 6 Although this assumption had long been
viewed with much skepticism within legal academic circles, 7 it was not
until the groundbreaking work of George Priest and Benjamin Klein 8
that empirical legal research conclusively proved its utility to legal
scholars. By examining actual court records, Priest and Klein identified
a number of recurring variables that created a selection bias in those
cases that went to trial-variables that were unlikely to be present in
cases that settled. This meant that the legal disputes that worked their
way up to appeal did not provide a representative sampling of all cases.
It was with this conclusion that empiricism began its ascent within
contemporary legal scholarship.
Although thd decisions of appellate courts are no longer
considered representative of all cases in the legal system, they are
nonetheless of critical importance for several reasons. First, the
provincial appellate courts are usually a litigant's only hope for relief
from trial errors, as less than 1.5% of the cases decided by provincial

See Sidney Raymond Peck, "A Behavioural Approach to the Judicial Process: Scalogram
Analysis" (1967) 5(1) Osgoode Hall L.J. 1; S.R. Peck, "The Supreme Court of Canada, 1958-1966:
A Search for Policy through Scalogram Analysis" (1967) 45 Can. Bar. Rev. 666; and Sidney R.
Peck, "A Scalogram Analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada, 1958-1967" in Glendon Schubert &
David J. Danelski, eds., Comparative Judicial Behavior. Cross-Cultural Studies of Political
Decision-Makingin the East and West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969) 293.
'5 See e.g. Philip Slayton, "A Critical Comment on Scalogram Analysis of Supreme Court
of Canada Cases" (1971) 21 U.T.L.J. 393, criticizing the utility of this sort of research. But see
Philip Slayton, "Quantitative Methods and Supreme Court Cases" (1972) 10 Osgoode Hall L.J. 429,
wherein the author retreats somewhat from his initial skepticism.
6
1 See e.g. Richard A. Posner, "A Theory of Negligence" (1972) 1 J.Legal Stud. 29.
7
" See e.g. Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (New York: Bretano's, 1930) at 10919. Frank argued that judges decide cases by arriving at tentative conclusions and then reasoning
backwards. For Frank, these tentatively formulated conclusions were influenced by a variety of
"stimuli," one of which includes the "idiosyncratic biases" of the individual judges.
"8 George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, "The Selection of Disputes for Litigation" (1984) 13
J.Legal Stud. 1.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 45, NO. 2

appellate courts proceed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

9

Second,

these courts play a central role in shaping the doctrines that control how
cases are dealt with in the trial courts. It is therefore not surprising that
empirical investigations into appellate court decisions are on the rise.
There have been a number of studies in the United States which
have employed quantitative methods to examine various aspects of
decision-making by appellate courts. 20 The recent study by Sunstein,
Schkade and Ellman examines the possible influence of ideology on the
voting patterns of judges on the U.S. Federal Courts of Appeals. 2' That
study used party of appointment as a proxy for ideology. For an eightyear period, it examined the votes of Democrat and Republican
appointees in certain categories of reported cases that seem most likely
to reveal ideological divisions, such as abortion and capital punishment.

'9 See generally Ian Greene et al., FinalAppeal: Decision-Making In Canadian Courts of
Appeal(Toronto: Lorimer, 1998).
0See Sheldon Goldman, "Voting Behaviour on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1961-

1964" (1966) 60 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 374; Bradley C. Canon & Dean Jaros, "External Variables,
Institutional Structure & Dissent on State Supreme Courts" (1970) 3 Polity 175; Sheldon Goldman,
"Voting Behaviour on the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited" (1975) 69 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.
491; J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Courts of Appeals in the FederalJudicial System: A Study of the
Second, Fifth and District of Columbia Circuits (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981);
Sheldon Goldman & Charles M. Lamb, eds., JudicialConflict and Consensus: BehavioralStudies
ofAmerican Appellate Courts (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1986); Stephen L. Wasby,
"Communication in the Ninth Circuit: A Concern for Collegiality" (1987) 11 University of Puget
Sound L. Rev. 73 [now the Seattle U.L. Rev.]; Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, "Who
Wins on Appeal? Upperdogs and Underdogs in the United States Courts of Appeals" (1992) 36
Am. J. Pol. Sci. 235; Gary Zuk, Gerard S. Gryski, & Deborah J. Barrow, "Partisan Transformation
of the Federal Judiciary, 1869-1992" (1993) 21 Am. Pol. Q. 439; Deborah J. Barrow, Gary Zuk &
Gerard S. Gryski, The Federal Judiciary and Institutional Change (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1996); Harold J. Spaeth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Majority Rule Or Minority Will:
Adherence to Precedent on the US. Supreme Court (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, "Searching for the Soul of Judicial
Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions" (2004) 65 Ohio St. L.J. 491;
David S. Law, "Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication and Asylum Law in the Ninth
Circuit" (2005) 73 U. Cin. L. Rev. 817; Theodore W. Ruger et al., "The Supreme Court Forecasting
Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking"
(2004) 104 Columbia L. Rev. 1150; Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, "Institutional Dynamics on
the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision Making" (2004) 20 J.L.
Econ. & Org. 299;.Richard L. Revesz, "Litigation and Settlement in the Federal Appellate Courts:
Impact of Panel Selection Procedures on Ideologically Divided Courts" (2000) 29 J. Legal Stud.
685; Jennifer L. Peresie, "Note: Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisonmaking in
the Federal Appellate Courts" (2005) 114 Yale L.J. 1759; Susan B. Haire, Donald R. Songer &
Stefanie A. Lindquist, "Appellate Court Supervision in the Federal Judiciary: A Hierarchical
Perspective" (2003) 37 Law & Soc'y Rev. 143; and Sunstein, Schkade & Ellman, supra note 4.
21Sunstein, Schkade & Ellman, ibid.
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The study found that in a number of areas the ideology of the judges
matters greatly. For example, overall, panels composed entirely of
Democrat appointees favoured a liberal outcome 61% of the time,
whereas panels composed exclusively of Republican appointees
preferred a liberal outcome only 34% of the time. In addition, there
were noteworthy results from involving mixed-party panels. In short,
when a panel consisted of both Democrat and Republican appointees,
the effect of ideology on outcome was significantly dampened.
A study by Theodore Ruger et a.22 focused'on decision-making
by the U.S. Supreme Court. By examining only a handful of
characteristics in cases decided between 1994 and 2002, the authors
were able to formulate a model that enabled them to predict the
outcome in 75% of the cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in
2003. In contrast, a panel of legal experts was able to forecast the
outcome correctly in only 59.1% of the cases.
An even more recent study focused on the influence of ideology
23
in the "unreported" decisions of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Apparently, over 80% of the Federal Courts of Appeals decisions are
unreported judgments that, depending upon the circuit, are either
considered to have little or no value as a precedent.2 4 The study found
that for certain judges, voting and publication were strategically
intertwined; some judges were willing to acquiesce in decisions that run
contrary to their ideological preferences in unreported cases, but were
prepared to dissent if the majority insisted on publication.
Finally, another recent American study probed the potential
influence of minority judges on panel behaviour in the federal appellate
courts.25 It found that the presence of a female or non-white judge is an
important predictor of panel decisions in discrimination cases. In
seeking an explanation for this finding, the authors argued that "this
phenomenon is driven by the institutional norm of unanimity on federal
appellate panels, which fosters deliberation and compromise that allows

22
23

Ruger et al, supra note 20.
See Law, supra note 20.
same is true in some Canadian appellate courts. For example, the Court of Appeal

24 The

for Ontario disposes of a great many cases through "unpublished" endorsements that, because of
their brevity, are often seen as having little precedential value.
21 See Farhang & Wawro, supra note 20. The authors define minority as female and "nonwhite" judges, a comparatively small minority relative to white men on the federal bench.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 45, NO.

2

numerical minorities on panels to influence case outcomes."" A similar
theory about the panels of the Court of Appeal for Ontario may also

explain many of our findings.
To date, most of the empirical research on Canadian appellate
courts has been focused on the various aspects of Supreme Court
decision-making: the rate at which the Court grants and refuses leave
applications; 27 trends in the sources the Court tends to cite in its
opinions; 1 the voting patterns of individual judges, alone and when
sitting together;29 the potential influence of some of the judges'
26

Ibid.at 300.

27

See S.I. Bushnell, "Leave to Appeal Applications: The 1984-85 Term" (1986) 8 Sup. Ct.

L. Rev. 382; S.I. Bushnell, "Leave to Appeal Applications: The 1985-86 Term" (1987) 9 Sup. Ct. L.
Rev. 467; S.I. Bushnell, "Leave to Appeal Applications: The 1986-87 Term" (1988) 10 Sup. Ct. L.
Rev. 361; S.I. Bushnell, "Leave to Appeal Applications: The 1987-88 Term" (1989) 11 Sup. Ct. L.
Rev. 383; Brian A. Crane & Henry S. Brown, "Leave to Appeal Applications: The 1988-89 Term"
(1990) 1 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 483; Henry S. Brown & Brian A. Crane, "Leave to Appeal
Applications: The 1989-90 Term" (1991) 2 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 473; Henry S. Brown, Brian A.
Crane & Patricia Brethour, "Leave to Appeal Applications: The 1990-91 Term" (1992) 3 Sup. Ct.
L. Rev. (2d) 381; Henry S. Brown, Brian A. Crane & Gordon Thomson, "Leave to Appeal
Applications: The 1991-92 Term" (1993) 4 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 27; Henry S. Brown, Brian A.
Crane & Michel Jolicoeur, "Annual Report on Applications for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada: The 1992-93 Term" (1994) 5 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 1; Brian A. Crane, Henry S.
Brown & Lorraine Allard, "Leave to Appeal Applications: The 1993-94 Term" (1995) 6 Sup. Ct. L.
Rev. (2d) 545; Henry S. Brown, Brian A. Crane & Kathleen Lemieux, "Leave to Appeal
Applications: The 1994-95 Term" (1996) 7 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 421; Henry S. Brown, Brian A.
Crane & Caroline Jill Date, "Annual Report on Applications for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada 1996-1997" (1998) 9 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 431; Henry S. Brown, Brian A. Crane &
Mary Rose Ebos, "Annual Report on Applications for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada 1997-1998" (1999) 10 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 513; Henry S. Brown, Brian A. Crane & Nicole D.
Winsor, "Annual Report on Applications for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada
2000-2001" (2001) 15 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 381; and Brian A. Crane, Henry S. Brown & Ryan E.
Flewelling, "Annual Report on Applications for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada"
(2003) 22 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 387.
z See Vaughan Black & Nicholas Richter, "Did She Mention My Name?: Citation of
Academic Authority by the Supreme Court of Canada, 1985-1990" (1993) 16 Dal. L.J. 377; Peter
McCormick, "The Supreme Court Cites the Supreme'Court: Follow-Up Citations on the Supreme
Court of Canada, 1989-1993" (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 453; Peter J. McCormick, "Judicial
Citation, the Supreme Court of Canada, and the Lower Courts: The Case of Alberta" (1996) 34
Alta. Law Rev. 870; Peter McCormick & Tammy Praskach, "Judicial Citation, the Supreme Court
of Canada, and the Lower Courts: A Statistical Overview and the Influence of Manitoba" (1996) 24
Man. L. J. 335; Peter McCormick, "Do Judges Read Books Too?: Academic Citations by the
Supreme Court of Canada 1991-96" (1998) 9 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 463; and Peter McCormick, "Second
Thoughts: Supreme Court Citation of Dissents and Separate Concurrences, 1949-1999," (2002) 81
Can. Bar. Rev. 369.
29See Andrew D. Heard, "The Charter in the Supreme Court of Canada: The Importance
of Which Judges Hear an Appeal" (1991) 24 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 289; Peter McCormick, "Follow the
Leader: Judicial Power and Judicial Leadership on the Laskin Court, 1973-1984" (1998) 24 Queen's
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background variables on their judging;3" how the judgments of the
various .provincial appellate courts fare when reviewed by the
Supreme Court;31 the Court's treatment of particular legal issues; 32
and, finally, the extent to which the Court has been "activist" in some
33
of its decisions.
By comparison, scholarship focusing on the provincial appellate
courts is a relatively recent development. Peter McCormick-a political
scientist-pioneered this new and valuable area of empirical judicial
research. McCormick's early work focused primarily on the Alberta and
Manitoba appellate courts. With respect to Alberta, he considered the

L.J. 237; Peter McCormick, "Birds of a Feather: Alliances and Influences on the Lamer Court
1990-1997" (1998) 36 Osgoode Hall L.J. 339; Peter J.McCormick, "The Most Dangerous Justice:
Measuring Judicial Power in the Lamer Court 1991-97" (1999) 22 Dal. L.J. 93; C. L. Ostberg,
Matthew E. Wetstein & Craig R. Ducat, "Attitudinal Dimensions of Supreme Court Decision
Making in Canada: The Lamer Court, 1991-1995" (2002) 55 Pol. Res. Q. 235; Lori Hausegger &
Stacia Haynie, "Judicial Decisionmaking and the Use of Panels in the Canadian Supreme Court
and the South African Appellate Division" (2003) 37 Law & Soc'y Rev. 635; Peter McCormick,
"'With Respect ...' - Levels of Disagreement on the Lamer Court 1990-2000" (2003) 48 McGill L.J.
89; C. L. Ostberg, Matthew E. Wetstein & Craig R. Ducat, "Acclimation Effects on the Supreme
Court of Canada: A Cross-Cultural Examination of Judicial Folklore" (2003) 84 Soc. Sci. Q. 704; C.
L. Ostberg, Matthew E. Wetstein & Craig R. Ducat, "Leaders, Followers, and Outsiders: Task and
Social Leadership on the Canadian Supreme Court in the Early 'Nineties' (2004) 36 Polity 505;
Matthew E. Wetstein & C. L. Ostberg, "Strategic Leadership and Political Change on the Canadian
Supreme Court: Analyzing the Transition to Chief Justice" (2005) 38 Can. J. of Pol. Sci. 653.
-' See Peter McCormick,
"Judicial Career Patterns and the Delivery of Reasons for
Judgment in the Supreme Court of Canada, 1949-1993" (1994) 5 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 499; C. Neal Tate
& Panu Sittiwong, "Decision making in the Canadian Supreme Court: Extending the Personal
Attributes Model Across Nations" (1989) 51:4 J. Pol. 900. ,

"' See Peter McCormick, "The Supervisory Role of the Supreme Court of Canada: Analysis
of Appeals from Provincial Courts of Appeal, 1949-1990" (1992) 3 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 1. See also
Barbara Billingsley & Bruce P. Elman, "The Supreme Court of Canada and the Alberta Court of
Appeal: Do the Top Courts Have a Fundamental Philosophical Difference of Opinion on Public
Law Issues?" (2001) 39 Alta. L. Rev. 703, compiling data on the Court's treatment of public law
judgments originating from the Alberta Court of Appeal.
32 See Gerard E. Mitchell,
The Supreme Court on Excluding Evidence Under the
Charter (Charlottetown: P.E.I. Law Foundation, 1992); F.L. Morton, Peter H. Russell &
Michael J.Withey, "The Supreme Court's First One Hundred Charter of Rights Decisions: A
Statistical Analysis" (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1; and C.L. Ostberg & Matthew Wetstein,
"Dimensions of Attitudes Underlying Search and Seizure Decisions of the Supreme Court of
Canada" (1998) 31:4 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 767.
-' See Sujit Choudhry & Claire E. Hunter, "Measuring Judicial Activism on the Supreme
Court of Canada: A Comment on Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. NAPE" (2003) 48 McGill
L.J. 525. For a critique, see Christopher P. Manfredi & James B. Kelly, "Misrepresenting the
Supreme Court's Record? A Comment on Sujit Choudhry and Claire E. Hunter, 'Measuring
Judicial Activism on the Supreme Court of Canada"' (2004) 49 McGill L.J. 741.
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treatment of sentence appeals in light of a number of variables (offence,
origin of case, panel composition, extent of any modification to
sentence).34 Similarly, McCormick also looked at how the court dealt
with criminal conviction appeals.3 5 This last study provided statistics on
the origins of the cases appealed, the overall success rate, and the
success rate of the accused as the appellant and the Crown as the
appellant. Statistics as to the processing speed of appeals were also
reported, as well as appeal success rates for five general categories of
offences. These results were not linked back to the composition of the
presiding panel, although a distinction was made between regular panels
and those containing ad hoe judges. More recently, Barbara Billingsley
and Bruce Elman36 examined all of the Alberta Court of Appeal's public
law decisions since the Charter was enacted that were subsequently
overturned by the Supreme Court. They concluded that some
fundamental philosophical differences divide the two courts in many of
these cases.
McCormick's studies of the Manitoba Court of Appeal are also
quite extensive. In one, he analyzed all of the Manitoba Court of Appeal
cases that were reviewed by the Supreme Court between 1906 and
1990.37 This study attempted to identify recurring patterns and variables
among these cases. In addition, McCormick looked at the court's
caseload and output over a four-year period. 8 With respect to output,
these studies reported on a number of relevant features of the court's
decisions: first, the success rates of appellants before the court generally
and, also, in specific categories of cases including sentence, criminal,
family, private law, public law, financial, and references; and second, the
voting patterns of specific judges generally-that is, the statistical rate at

' Peter McCormick, "Sentence Appeals to the Alberta Court of. Appeal, 1985-1992: A
Statistical Analysis of the Laycraft Court" (1993) 31 Alta. L. Rev. 624.
' Peter McCormick, "Conviction Appeals to the Alberta Court of Appeal: A Statistical
Analysis, 1985-1992" (1993) 31 Alta. L. Rev. 301.
36
Billingsley & Elman, supra note 31.
"zPeter McCormick & Suzanne Maisey, "A Tale of Two Courts 11: Appeals from the
Manitoba Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court of Canada, 1906-1990" (1992) 21 Man. L.J. 1.
' See Peter McCormick, "Caseload and Output of the Manitoban Court of Appeal: An
Analysis of Twelve Months of Reported Cases" (1990) 19 Man. L. 31; Peter McCormick,
"Caseload and Output of the Manitoba Court of Appeal, 1989" (1991) 19 Man. L.J. 334; Peter
McCormick, "Caseload and Output of the Manitoba Court of Appeal, 1990" (1992) 21 Man. L.J.
24; and Peter McCormick, "Caseload and Output of the Manitoba Court of.Appeal, 1991" (1993)
22 Man. L.J. 263 [McCormick, "Manitoba Court of Appeal, 1991"].
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which each judge voted to dismiss or allow appeals. More specifically,
these studies considered, how each judge voted in criminal appeals-the
statistical rate at which each judge favoured the Crown, as opposed to
the accused, in criminal appeals. (Cases within the criminal category
were not broken down further based on offence type or the fact that a
Charterclaim may have been involved.) These studies also reported on
a number of other aspects related to decision-making at the Manitoba
Court of Appeal, including the rate at which individual judges dissented
from the majority, apparent alliances between certain judges based on
frequency of pairings in non-unanimous decisions, the source of
precedents cited by the court in its judgments, and the rate at which
precedents from various courts were cited in specific categories of cases.
Finally, the most recent study of the Manitoba Court of Appeal also
included an analysis of an additional variable: success rates based on the
type of litigant (ie. Crown, "Big" Business, Federal or Provincial
Government, Business, Municipal Government, Individuals, Other
Litigants).39 This study revealed that in cases decided between 19891991 "Big" Business succeeded before the court 65.7% of the time,
whereas individuals only succeeded 38.5% of the time.4"
There are analogous studies of the Saskatchewan Court of
Appeal by Dwight Newman,4 1 which examined the output of the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal from both quantitative and qualitative
standpoints. Newman's studies included statistics on the types of cases
decided, the number of decisions rendered by each judge and the form
of those decisions (ie. written or oral), as well as the voting record of
each judge generally, and more specifically in both civil and criminal
cases. The voting record of the judges was then broken down further,
depending upon whether the Crown or the accused was appealing and
whether the appeal was against a conviction or a sentence. Beyond
these general categories, however, none of these studies tracked the
voting of individual judges with respect to more discrete legal issues
within each category.

39
4
0

McCormick, "Manitoba Court of Appeal, 1991," ibid.
Ibid.

"' See Dwight G. Newman, "A Study of the Judgments of'the Saskatchewan Court of
Appeal, 2000" (2002) 65 Sask. L. Rev. 107; Dwight G. Newman, "A Study of the Judgments of the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, 2001" (2003) 66 Sask. L. Rev. 21; and Dwight G. Newman, "A
Study of the Judgments of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, 2002" (2004) 67 Sask. L. Rev. 13.
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McCormick and others also studied the processing of appeals by
the Court of Appeal for Ontario.4 2 This group collaborated again in
1998, publishing the first comprehensive study on appellate courts in
Canada.43 That study employed both qualitative and quantitative
methods; 80% of the judges sitting on Canadian appellate courts were
interviewed, and a representative sample of 6,000 cases from these
courts were analyzed. The empirical analysis of the cases yielded
statistical insights into various aspects of decision-making by appellate
courts across the country, including the stage of the process at which
criminal appeals are resolved (before or after hearing); the rate at which
judgments are reserved on criminal and civil cases; the attributes of the
decisions (details about length and citations); the rate of dissenting
opinions and large panels presiding over appeals, historically; the speed
at which appeals are processed and heard; the length of hearings; the
amount of time that elapses between hearing and judgment; and the
rate at which substantive criminal appeals are allowed and dismissed.
Our study builds on the existing scholarship by employing a
combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. Like some earlier
Canadian studies, we observe the voting patterns of the court generally
and also of each judge individually. This data set includes every reported
decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario between 1990 and 2003. In
addition, unlike past studies, our data tracks judges by both party of
appointment and gender. Just as importantly, the data that were
collected distinguishes between different areas of law and, in certain
areas where we thought it might prove relevant, creates subcategories
within those areas. Beyond tracking the judges and the subject matter of
the cases, this study also tracks case outcomes based on the type of
litigant. It is only through this sort of multivariate analysis that real
insight can be gained into whether or not extraneous factors, such as
gender or party of appointment, matter to case outcomes. In short, we
undertake in Canada the kind of empirical research into appellate court
decision-making that has existed for some time in the United States, and
which has been on the rise there in recent years.44

42 See Carl Baar et al., "The Ontario Court of Appeal and Speedy Justice" (1992) 30

Osgoode Hall L.J. 261.
43

See Ian Greene etal, supra note 19.

'See supra note 12.
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THE METHODOLOGY OF THIS STUDY

Each case decided by the Court of Appeal for Ontario between
1990 and 2003 was initially indexed by reference to eight broad
categories: Criminal Law, Public Law, Commercial Law, Family Law,
Employment Law, Labour Law, Private Law, and Other. Within each
category further distinctions were drawn, and identifiers were used
and tracked to distinguish between various classes of litigants
depending on the context. Our initial subcategories and party
identifiers were as follows:
CRIMINAL LAW
Subcategories

[Definitions

[Parties

Offences Against
the Person

Homicide, assault, robbery, etc.

Crown; Accused

Offences Against
Property Rights
Public Morals

Theft, fraud, etc.

Crown; Accused

Prostitution, gaming, etc.

Crown; Accused

Narcotics

Importing, trafficking, possession, etc.

Crown; Accused
Crown; Accused

Sexual Assault
Domestic
Violence

All offences of sexual violence, sexual assault,
aggravated sexual assault, sexual exploitation, etc.
Crimes of violence where accused and
complainant are in domestic relationship

Criminal-Other

Crimes that do not fall into the above categories

Crown; Accused

CriminalRegulatory
Charter-Casespecific Remedy
CharterInvalidation
CharterCombined

Offences other than those that are characterized as Crown; Defendant
criminal or narcotics offences
Charterapplications where accused seeks
exclusion of evidence or stay of proceedings
Crown; Accused
Charterapplication where accused seeks
Crown; Accused
declaration of invalidity
Case-specific remedy sought, along with
Crown; Accused
declaration of invalidity

Crown; Accused

PUBLIC LAW
Subcategores

Definitions

Parties

Non-criminal
Charter
Constitutional
Coistiona
Powers

Charterclaimsother than those advanced in
criminal proceedings

Individual; Corporation;
Crown; Other State Actor
Individual; Corporation;
Provincial Government;
Federal Government;
Other State Actor

Human Rights

Constitutional litigation focused on the viresof
legislation

private actors, usually
Rights claims as betweeniat
under human rights legislatiun

Individual; Corporation;
Crown; Human Rights
Commission
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Administrative
Law
AboriginalConstitutional

AboriginalOther

Environmental

Individual; Corporation;
Crown; Administrative
Body
Individual; Band;
Litigation that raises issues under sections 25
Provincial Government;
and/or 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982
Federal Government;
Other State Act
All other forms of litigation that primarily raise
Individual; Band;
issues affecting Aboriginal Peoples, but not
Provincial Government;
involving sections 25 and/or 35 of the Constitution Federal Government;
Act, 1982"4
Other State Actor
All litigation raising environmental issues,
Individual; Corporation;
including prosecutions for violations of
Crown
environmental protection legislation, etc.
All litigation touching on administrative law
matters

COMMERCIAL LAW
Subcategories
Contracts

Definitions
Litigation regarding contractual claims

Corporate LawOppression
Remedy
Corporate LawAll Others
Insurance Law

Corporate litigation in which minority
shareholders pursue an oppression claim against
majority shareholders
Corporate litigation involving all other claims
All litigation relating to insurance law claims

Parties
Individual; Corporation;
Crown; Other State Actor
Minority Shareholder(s);
Majority Shareholder(s)
Individual; Corporation
Individual; Corporation

FAMILY LAW
Subcategories
Child Custody
Child Support
Spousal Support
Other

Definitions

Parties

Family litigation involving disputes over
custody and/or access issues
Family litigation involving disputes over
of child support
Family litigation involving disputes over
of spousal support
Other family law litigation not captured
above subcategories

child
questions
questions
by the

Husband/Father;
Wife/Mother
Husband/Father;
Wife/Mother
Husband/Father;
Wife/Mother
Husband/Father;
Wife/Mother

EMPLOYMENT & LABOUR LAW
Subcategories

Definitions

Wrongful
Dismissal
Labour

Litigation in which an employee seeks damages
Employee; Employer
against an employer for wrongful dismissal
Labour disputes between groups of employees and Union; Employee;
their employer
Management

5

Being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.

Parties

2
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Although we initially used the above subcategories to collect our
data, some subcategories contained too few observations for statistical
analysis. As a result, we collapsed the above subcategories, creating
more general classifications, which were then subjected to further
statistical analysis. These broad categories and the component
subcategories are as follows:
Broad Categories

Original Subcategory Components

Aboriginal

Aboriginal-Charter; Aboriginal-Other

Administrative Law

Administrative Law; Taxation
Non-criminal Charter;Constitutional Division of Powers; Human
Rgt
Rights

Constitutional Law
Private Law
Criminal Charter

Contracts; Corporate Law-Oppression Remedy; Corporate
Law-All Other; Insurance Law; Negligence; Torts
Charter-Case-specificRemedy; Charter-Invalidation;CharterCombined
CDomestic Violence; Narcotics; Sexual Assault; Offences Against
the Person; Property Offences; Public Morals; Criminal-Other

Criminal Gender

Domestic Violence; Sexual Assault

Public Law

Criminal-Regulatory; Environmental

Family Law

Child Custody; Child Support; Spousal Support; Family-Other

Labour

Labour; Wrongful Dismissal

Human Rights

Non-criminal Charter;Human Rights

Professional Responsibility

Professional Responsibility

Finally, we classified the judges of the appellate panels by their
gender and by the party that formed the government which appointed
them to the Court of Appeal for Ontario. The decision to track party of
appointment, as opposed to other background variables that might serve
to reveal political allegiances, was deliberate. It is true that the judicial
appointments process in Canada is not as overtly partisan as it is in the
United States. It is not at all difficult to name judges who are widely
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perceived as being "liberal" who were appointed by a Conservative
government, or judges considered "conservative" who were appointed by
a Liberal government. As a result, we contemplated tracking judges based
on perceptions of whether they are "conservative" or "liberal" in their
judging. This would empirically measure whether such perceptions are
rooted in fact or should be attributed to some other factor. The difficulty
in this approach lay in deciding how to categorize the judges. We initially
considered surveying members of the legal academy and profession, but
ultimately decided against this, as our preliminary inquiries revealed that
although this method might work for some known judges, there were too
many judges of the Court of Appeal for Ontario for whom our respondents
would have no preconceptions. In contrast, party of appointment is a
fixed variable that is applicable to each and every judge. in addition, if the
appointments process is in fact apolitical, one would expect no discernible
differences in the voting patterns of judges who were appointed by
governments headed by different parties. As a result, we decided that
party of appointment is a worthwhile variable to track in this study.
The judges in our sample are listed in Table 1. The party of
appointment refers to the party that was in power when each judge was
appointed to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.46
Table 1: The Judges in the Sample by Name, Party of Appointment to the Court of Appeal, and Gender
Judge

[Party of Appointment

Gender

Rosalie Abella

Conservative

Female

Louise Arbour

Liberal

Female

Robert B. Armstrong

Liberal

Male

Allan McNiece Austin

Conservative

Male

Stephen Borins

Liberal

Male

John W. Brooke

Conservative

Male

James J. Carthy

Conservative

Male

Marvin Catzman

Conservative

Male

Louise Charron

Conservative

Female

Eleanore A. Cronk

Conservative

Female

David H. Doherty

Conservative

Male

Charles L. Dubin

Liberal

Male

Kathryn N. Feldman

Liberal

Female

4 If a judge was initially appointed to the Superior Court by the Conservatives but was
subsequently elevated to the Court of Appeal by the Liberals, we classified the judge as "Liberal."
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George D. Finlayson

Conservative

Male

Patrick T. Galligan

Conservative

Male

Eileen E. Gillese

Liberal

Female

Stephen T. Goudge

Liberal

Male

Samuel Grange

Liberal

Male

Peter D. Griffiths

Conservative

Male

Lloyde Houlden

Liberal

Male

Horace Krever

Conservative

Male

Jean-Marc Labrosse

Conservative

Male

Maurice Norbert Lacourci~re

Conservative

Male

John I. Laskin

Liberal

Male

James C. MacPherson

Liberal

Male

Hilda McKinlay

Liberal

Female

R. Roy McMurtry

Liberal

Male

Michael J. Moldaver

Liberal

Male

John Wilson Morden

Conservative

Male

Dennis R. O'Connor

Liberal

Male

Coulter Osborne

Conservative

Male

Sydney L. Robins

Conservative

Male

Marc Rosenberg

Liberal

Male

Liberal

Male

Liberal

Male

Conservative

Female

Robert J. Sharpe
Walter Tarnopolsky

•

Karen M. Weiler

IV.

CASE OUTPUT: SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

Between 1990 and 2003, the Court of Appeal for Ontario
released a total of 4,906 reported decisions, 47 most of which were
decided by panels of three judges. 4a The number of reported judgments
in each year is set out in Table 2.
Table 2: Number of Cases by Year
Year

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total

Number 181
of Cases

203

225

201

259

262

305

343

412

561

506

506

490

452

4906

"'See Part I for a discussion of the incidence of so-called "unreported" judgments, typically
disposed of by means of an "endorsement."
I Sometimes panels of five judges sit together; when one of the five panellists becomes
unavailable, four judges render the decision.
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The number of cases in each of our initial subcategories
(hereafter referred to as the "narrow categories") is set out in Table 3a.
The breakdown of cases based on the broad categories that we
ultimately settled on for the purpose of our statistical analysis is set out
in Table 3b.
Table 3a: Number of Cases by Narrow Category
Number of Cases

Percent

Aboriginal-Charter

Case Type by Narrow Category

2

0.04

Aboriginal-Other

20

0.41

Administrative Law

123

2.51

Charter-Invalidation

2

0.04

Constitutional

54

1.10

Contracts

387

7.89

Corporate Law-Oppression

18

0.37

Corporate Law-All Other

67

1.37

Criminal-CharterCase-specific
Remedies

250

5.10

Criminal-CharterIssues Combined

7

0.14

Criminal- CharterInvalidation

42

0.86

Criminal-Domestic Violence

50

1.02

Criminal-Narcotics

247

5.03

Criminal-Offences Against the Person

772

15.74

Criminal-Other

299

6.09

Criminal-Offences Against Property Rights

211

4.30

Criminal-Public Morals

55

1.12

Criminal-Regulatory

56

1.14

Criminal-Sexual Assault

533

10.86

Environmental

21

0.43

Family-Child Custody

"38

0.77

Family-Child Support

48

0.98

Family-Other

90

1.83

Family-Spousal Support

61

1.24

Human Rights

18

0.37

Insurance

222

4.53

Labour

73

1.49

290

5.91

Negligence
Non-criminal Charter

87

1.77.

Other

446

9.09

Professional Responsibility

42

0.86

Taxation

38

0.77
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133

2.71

Wrongful Dismissal

104

2.12

Table 3b: Number of Cases by Broad Category
Case Type by Broad Category

Number of Cases

Percent

Aboriginal

22

0.45

Administrative Law

161

3.28

Constitutional Law

54

1.10

Criminal-Non-Charter

1584

32.3

Criminal- Charter

299

6.10

Criminal-Gender

583

11.89

Family

237

4.83

Human Rights

105

2.14

Labour

177

3.61

Other

446

9.09

Professional Responsibility

42

0.86

Private

1117

22.78

Public

77

1.57

Some narrow categories, such as criminal offences against the
person and sexual assaults, each accounted for over 10% of the total
number of cases during this time period. Additionally, contract cases,
criminal cases involving narcotics, criminal cases where a Charter
remedy was sought (which were often narcotics cases), negligence cases,
and insurance cases each accounted for over 5% of the total number of
cases during this period. In terms of the broader categories, criminal
cases made up over 38% of the court's reported judgments, of which
11% involved sexual assaults and domestic violence, while private law
disputes made up 23% of the court's reported cases.
Table 4 reports the disposition of cases below, while Table 5
reports the outcomes of the cases on appeal. About 18% of appeals
concern a criminal sentence or the quantum of damages. Appeals from
criminal convictions represent roughly 31% of cases, but only slightly
under 4% of appeals result from the Crown appealing an acquittal. In
private law disputes both winners and losers appealed with an equal
frequency of 21%. On appeal, 57% of the cases were affirmed, while
42% of the decisions appealed from were overturned. Table 6a reports
the disposition of appeals of selected narrow categories in which there
were 100 observations or more, while Table 6b does the same based on
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the broad categories. The affirmation rate was consistently high in each
category, and it is especially high for private law disputes.
Table 4: Disposition of Cases at Trial
Decision

[

Number of Cases

49

[

Percent

896

18.26

Acquittal

177

3.61

Allowed

1121

22.85

Conviction

1544

31.47

Dismissal

1075

21.91

Plea

3

0.06

Stay

90

1.83

Magnitude

Table 5: Disposition of Cases on Appeal
Number of Cases

Percent

Affirm

2818

57.44

Overturn

2083

42.46

5

0.1

Decision

Stay

Table 6a: Percentage of Affirmation in Narrow Categories with 100 or More Observations.
Case Type by Narrow Categories with 100+ Observations

Percent Affirmed

Administrative Law

55

Contracts

63

Criminal-CharterCase-Specific Remedies

58

Criminal-Narcotics

53

Criminal-Offences Person Against the Person

60

Criminal-Other

51

Criminal-Offences Against Property Rights

54

Criminal-Public Morals

55

Criminal-Sexual Assault

51

Insurance

59

Negligence

60

Other

58

Torts

69

Wrongful Dismissal

60

49

Magnitude refers to sentences applied in criminal cases and damages awarded in civil cases.
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Table 6b: Percentage of Affirmation in Broad Categories
Case Type by Broad Categories

[

337

Percent Affirmed

Aboriginal

50

Administrative Law

55

Constitutional Law

67

Criminal-Non-Charter

56

Criminal- Charter

60

Criminal-Gender

51

Family

57

Human Rights

66

Labour

57

Other

58

Professional Responsibility

67

Private

62

Public

38

Dissenting judgments were quite rare. As Table 7a reveals, there
were dissents in only about 6% of the court's reported judgments-quite
a powerful statistic. Table 7b presents the unanimity rate by year, and it
reveals an increasing trend towards unanimous judgments. Perhaps this
reflects the retirement of earlier Conservative appointees and therefore
an increased level of political homogeneity among the remaining
judges-recall that the Liberals won the federal election in 1993, and
therefore, that more and more-Liberal appointees joined the court after
1994. Nonetheless, even at its lowest rate of 87%, the Court of Appeal
for Ontario tends to have an institutional orientation toward consensus.5"
Our findings also reveal that very little variation in unanimity
rates as between different categories of cases. In other words, the judges
tended to reach consensus in their decision-making regardless of the
nature of the case. (Table 7c reports the unanimity rate for the narrow
categories with 100 observations or more, while Table 7d does the same
for the broad categories.) Nevertheless, there are some noteworthy
variations. For example, the level of unanimity is at its highest in

The collegiality that develops between judges working closely together on an appellate
court may very well serve to explain this extraordinarily high rate of unanimous decision-making.
See generally Harry T. Edwards, "The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making" (2003)
151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1639.
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narcotics cases (97%), but drops off significantly in sexual assault cases
(93%). This may reflect the comparatively contentious nature of cases in
the latter category.
Table 7a: Unanimity Rate
Nature of Decision

Percent

Number of Cases

Dissent

278

5.67

Unanimous

4628

94.33

Table 7b: Unanimity Rate by Year
11990 1991 199211993 1994 1995119961199711998119991200012001 2002
92
85 1 92 1 92 1 90
91 1 92
97 1 94 1 96 1 96 1 95
97

IYear
UnanimityRate

Table 7c: Unanimity Rate by Narrow Categories with 100 or More Observations
Case Type-Narrow Categories with 100 or More Observations

Percent Unanimous

Administrative Law

94

Contracts

95

Criminal-CharterCase-Specific Remedies

96

Criminal-Narcotics

97

Criminal-Offences Person Against the Person

94

Criminal-Other

95

Criminal-Offences Against Property Rights

94

Criminal-Public Morals

95

Criminal-Sexual Violence

93

Insurance

95

Negligence

94

Other

94

Torts

94

Wrongful Dismissal

97

Table 7d: Unanimity Rate by Broad Categories
Case Type-Broad Categories .

Percent Unanimous

Aboriginal

100

Administrative Law

95

Constitutional Law

87

Criminal-Non- Charter

95

Criminal-Charter

94

Criminal-Gender

92

Family

96

Human Rights

96

Labour

96

2003]
98
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Other

94

Professional Responsibility

100

Private

95

Public

88

Decisions which are issued by "The Court" (known
as Per
Curium in the United States) are also quite pervasive. These judgments
comprise approximately one third of the cases, as shown in Table 8a.
Curiously, in 64% of the time, the result was to affirm, rather than to
overturn, the decisions from below. The use of the decisions issued by
"The Court" by broad category is presented in Table 8b.
Table 8a: Decisions Issued by "The Court"
Decision Issued by "The Court"

Frequency

Percent

No

3072

62.62

Yes

1834

37.38

Table 8b: Percentage of Decisions Issued by "The Court"
Case Type

Percent

Aboriginal

55

Administrative Law

28

Constitutional Law

31

Criminal-Non- Charter

43

Criminal-Charter

29

Criminal-Gender

42

Family

38

Human Rights

31

Labour

28

Other

32

Professional Responsibility

50

Private

35

Public

19

Finally, our study also reveals a fair amount of diversity in the
appeal panels assembled by the court. The composition of panels in
terms of the two characteristics, gender and party of appointment, is
reflected in Tables 9a and 9b, respectively. Roughly 59% of the panels
included judges of both genders, while 41% of the panels were all male;
only 0.51% of the panels in this period were constituted entirely by
female judges. In terms of who appointed the judges, 73% of the panels
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were mixed; that is, they were made up of judges appointed by both a
Conservative government and a Liberal government. While 18% of the
panels comprised only Conservative appointees, 9% of the panels were
made up only of Liberal appointees. Given that the Liberals took office
in 1993, a period preceded by nine years of government by the
Progressive Conservatives, the court between 1990 and 2003 was rich
with judges appointed by both parties. In terms of actual votes cast,
Table 9c shows that 23% of the votes were cast by female judges, while
Table 9d shows that Conservative appointees cast 59% of the votes, and
Liberal appointees cast 41% of the votes.
Table 9a: Gender Composition of Panels
Gender of Panel

Number

Percent

Female

25

0.51

Mixed

2893

58.97

Male

1988

40.52

Table 9b: Party of Appointment Composition of Panels
Politics of Panel

Number

Percent

Conservative

905

18.45

Mixed

3578

72.93

Liberal

423

8.62

Table 9c: Votes by Judges' Gender
Number of Votes

Percent

Female

Gender

3239

22.8

Male

10966

77.2

Table 9d: Votes by Judges' Party of Appointment
Party of Appointment

Number of Votes

Percent

Conservative

8376

58.97

Liberal

5829

41.03

V.

BEYOND CASE COUNTING:
VOTING BEHAVIOUR

TRENDS

IN

PANEL

In order to make more penetrating observations regarding the
court's decision-making, the next step in our data analysis examined the
rate at which the court affirmed or overturned cases in each of our
categories, relative to the outcome of the court below. For example, while
we report the rate of affirmation in each of our broad categories in Table
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5b, above, we do not distinguish those rates based on the decisions from
below. In the Criminal Non-Chartercategory, for instance, a case could
be on appeal from either a conviction or an acquittal; whether the court
affirms convictions or overturns acquittals may be seen as a measure of
how "pro-accused" or "pro-Crown" the court may be. Of course, this may
also reflect the actual merits of the cases in the different categories.
Nevertheless, significant variations in these rates as between the different
subcategories of the cases would be curious. Accordingly, we conducted a
multivariate analysis of affirmation rates linked to case outcomes below
for each of our subcategories. Using the logistic regression model (also
known as the Logit procedure), 5 we tested whether the court affirmed
the decision below as a function of case category and the disposition
below. The equation is as follows:

P(Y)y =1, Affirm case category interacted with Decision below
yi=O, Overturn

The variable on the left represents the panel's decision, either to
affirm or to overturn. The right side is a set of interactive dummies52
representing the case category interacted with the decisions from below.
The purpose of this procedure is to determine which categories have a
statistically significant pattern of affirming or overturning decisions of
the court below. The Logit procedure looks at a set of variables, such as
whether the appellant was convicted of a narcotics offence, and
measures the impact of this category on the odds that the judge will
affirm or reverse the conviction.
Where a sufficient number of observations existed, we also
broke down the decision from below based on what we termed
"Magnitude," relative to which party was appealing, whether it was the
defendant appealing the damages ordered against it (MagDef) or the
plaintiff appealing the adequacy of the damage award (MagPl).
Similarly, for criminal sentence appeals, we broke Magnitude .into
MagCrn and MagDef depending on whether the Crown or the accused

s For a detailed introduction to the Logit procedure, see William H. Greene, Econometric
Analysis, 3d ed. (Toronto: Prentice Hall, 1997) at 912-25.
I This is a technical term which means that the variable takes on a value of 0 if the category
is absent and 1 if the category is present. No intercept was used.
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was appealing against the sentence. In the family law categories, we
reclassified the decision from below into Male and Female depending
on the gender of the appellant: Male meant that the husband or father
(or other male party) was appealing an adverse decision, and Female
meant that a mother or wife was appealing. We eliminated those
observations for which there was incomplete data. We also eliminated
five observations where the court had stayed the decision below. This
left us with 4,805 observations.
A.

Are There Noteworthy Differences in Affirmation Rates Within
andBetween Categories?

Our study reveals a number of areas in which there are
statistically significant patterns of affirming or reversing lower court
decisions. We classified those categories for which the p-value 53 is less
than 0.1 (10%) as statistically significant. Where a category is
insignificant, there are two possible explanations. The first is that there
is no genuinely discernible pattern in the court's decision-making within
that category. The second is that there are not enough observations to
discern from a statistical standpoint whether there is in fact an existing
or emerging pattern.
1.

Statistically Significant Findings
We now turn to the statistically significant findings.

i.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

In the narrow categories, not including taxation cases, our data
reveal that individuals who appealed an adverse ruling were
unsuccessful in their appeals at a statistically significant rate of 64%.
ii.

CRIMINAL LAW

Statistically noteworthy patterns are also apparent in criminal
cases, especially those involving Charter claims. While dismissals of
constitutional challenges to a statute were affirmed on appeal almost

' P-value is the level of confidence we can have in the outcome of the court being random.
We chose 10% as our cut-off for which results we interpreted as being statistically significant.
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90% of time, acquittals obtained via case-specific Charterremedy (ie.
the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence or a stay of
proceedings) were reversed on appeal 91% of the time.54 Where a casespecific Charter remedy was refused and a conviction resulted, the
appellate court affirmed the conviction 71% of the time. In narcotics
cases, acquittals appealed by the Crown were reversed 87.5% of the
time, while convictions appealed by the accused were affirmed 59% of
the time. It is not surprising that the Charter-Case-specificRemedies
cases and the narcotics cases seem to receive comparable treatment.
Many of the Charter-Case-specificRemedies cases are also narcotics
cases. These are cases in which, at trial, the accused unsuccessfully
challenged the police search that led to the discovery of the drugs that
were ultimately used to secure a conviction.
Interesting trends also continue in non-narcotics criminal cases.
Appeals of convictions and sentences in criminal cases involving
offences against the person were affirmed 62% of the time. The Crown's
appeals of cases involving property offences were successful 87.5% of
the time, while the accused's appeal of these cases were successful only
42% of the time. The Crown was also successful in appealing acquittals
in 88% of cases involving regulatory offences. Sentence appeals by the
Crown in sexual assault cases were successful 78% of the time. In
contrast, sentence appeals by those convicted of sexual assault cases
were dismissed 76% of the time.
It is not surprising that in criminal matters the Crown has such a
high success rate on appeal. Our study reveals that the Crown appeals at
a far lower rate than individual accused persons, which suggests that
there is a great deal of pre-screening within the Crown's office before an
appeal is launched. In short, the Crown seems to exercise its right of
appeal sparingly, restricting itself to those cases where success on appeal
seems likely. As a result, the Crown tends to be successful in criminal
appeals at a considerably higher rate than individuals appealing their
convictions or sentences.

4
The rate is 18.5%, but this is the rate of affirmation, which means that the rate of reversal
is 91.5%. It should be noted that in Ontario, appeals by the Crown, which is what these cases
involve, are comparatively rare. In short, the Crown appears to be far more selective when it comes
to deciding whether or not to appeal.
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FAMILY LAW

Family law cases also reveal some noteworthy results. For
example, males who appealed trial judgments relating to child custody,
the quantum of spousal support, or other related matters were
unsuccessful in 70%, 63%, and 61% of the cases, respectively.
iv.

CORPORATE LAW

Corporate law produced a rather interesting and entirely
unexpected result. The court, at the extraordinarily high rate of 89%,
affirmed oppression actions that were dismissed at trial. In other words,
minority shareholders who failed to make out a claim at trial enjoyed a
less than one in ten chance of success on appeal! This is a fact that
lawyers who act for minority shareholders may wish to bring to a client's
attention before initiating what will most likely be, according to these
data, an unsuccessful (and no doubt costly) appeal.
v.

PRIVATE LAW

Deference appears to be the watchword for most private law
disputes that come before the court. Contracts, insurance, negligence,
and torts cases were affirmed 60% of the time, regardless of the result
below. That is, the affirmation rate did not vary based on who won or
lost at trial. Thus, there seems to be a clear tendency to defer to the
judgments of the trial courts in private law matters. This is significant
because few litigants would bear the cost of appealing a civil judgment,
unless they could be optimistic about their chances for success.55 Those
contemplating an appeal from a civil judgment should probably keep
this statistical reality in mind before deciding to run the added risk of a
further cost award should they be unsuccessful on appeal.
2.

Aggregated Categories

As was noted above, in some areas, the absence of statistically
significant observations may be an artifact of too few observations in
that category or, alternatively, a reflection of the fact that there really is
no discernible trend in these areas. One way to remedy the small data
'Priest & Klein, supranote 18 at 5.
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problem is to aggregate the categories. Using the broader category
definitions and reapplying the Logit produced some noteworthy results.
i.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

In the broad category of administrative law, corporations
appealing adverse decisions were likely to be unsuccessful 64% of the
time. Although individuals were also likely to be unsuccessful on appeal,
the statistically significant difference in the success rate between
individuals and corporations disappeared. Aggregating tax and other
administrative decisions seemed to indicate that corporations are less
successful, but it also blurred the trend, noted in more discrete
categories, that individuals were not as successful. Recall that when
using the narrow categorization, individuals were generally unsuccessful
in appealing adverse administrative decisions, but this broader analysis
of the data reveals that individuals are successful at appealing taxation
decisions, albeit in a statistically insignificant manner. Hence, combining
these observations removes any trend associated with individuals, but
strengthens it for corporations, since corporations were unsuccessful in
both administrative and tax appeals.
ii.

CRIMINAL LAW

In non-Charter criminal law cases, convictions were affirmed
61% of the time, acquittals were overturned 71% of the time, sentence
appeals by defendants were affirmed 57% of the time, and stays ordered
in the court below were overturned 76% of the time. In cases where a
Charterclaim was advanced in the court below, the results on appeals
from convictions, acquittals, and stays remained essentially the same.
For example, where a Charterclaim was rejected at trial, the result was
affirmed on appeal 76% of the time. Crimes that had a gender
component, such as sexual assault and domestic violence, resulted in
successful sentence appeals by the Crown 75% of the time; meanwhile,
sentence appeals by offenders were unsuccessful 74% of the time, and
appeals by the Crown against a stay of proceedings were successful 82%
of the time. Again, these results, at a minimum, confirm the selection
bias, noted above, with respect to Crown appeals in criminal matters.
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FAMILY LAW

Family law stood out yet again. Males who appealed an adverse
decision in family law disputes were unsuccessful 62% of the time.
iv.

PRIVATE LAW

In private law cases, regardless of whether or not liability was
found, the court affirmed the result at the rate of 62%. In addition,
appeals by plaintiffs with respect to the quantum of damages were
dismissed 67% of the time.
To this point, we have reported the averages for the court as a
whole. The next part addresses our main line of inquiry: whether or
not party of appointment or gender played any role in the outcomes
of these cases.
B.

Does PartyofAppointment Matter?

To isolate the political element, we reapplied the Logit
procedure, this time including the party of appointment of the panel as
an independent or explanatory variable. Recall that the dependant
variable (the variable that is to be explained) is the panel's decision to
affirm or overturn. The explanatory variables are the case's category, the
decision below, and the panel's party of appointment. Panels were
classified as Conservative, Liberal, or Mixed.
There were a number of noteworthy results, in the broad
categories, which suggest that, at least in some cases, party of
appointment does indeed matter.5 6 Most surprising, however, is that in
some instances, party of appointment mattered in ways that were
unexpected and even counterintuitive.
Beginning with constitutional cases where a party challenged the
constitutionality of a statute and the case was dismissed at trial, Mixed
panels affirmed the dismissal 95% of the time, in a statistically
significant way in comparison to single-party panels. Conservative
panels affirmed 71% of the time, but these results were not statistically
significant; Liberal panels also affirmed such dismissals but the results

5'All results henceforth will be with respect to the broad categories, unless otherwise noted.
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were similarly not significant.5 7 In cases where the trial court dismissed a
Charterchallenge, an appellant facing a Conservative panel would have
no a prioriindication as to the direction of the ruling, whereas in facing
a Mixed panel, the appellant would know that there is only a 5% chance
of successfully appealing the trial court's decision.
In cases of the Criminal-Non-Chartercategory where the
accused appealed the length of the sentence, Mixed panels affirmed the
sentence 57% of the time. In cases where the Crown appealed an
acquittal, there was a noticeable difference depending on the.
composition of the panel. Conservative panels overturned acquittals
76% of the time, whereas Mixed panels overturned acquittals 70% of the
time. Convictions were affirmed by Conservative panels and Mixed
panels at a rate of 62% and 61% respectively.58
A panel's composition matters greatly in criminal cases involving
Charter claims seeking to either exclude evidence or invalidate a
legislation. In these cases, where the Charterargument was unsuccessful
at trial and the accused was convicted, the panels generally affirmed the
conviction. Conservative panels affirmed at a rate of 65%, Mixed panels
at a rate of 70%, and Liberal panels at a rate of 87%. This is quite a stark
and surprising result, as one might expect Conservative-appointed
judges to be less likely to accede to Charter arguments than their
Liberal counterparts. That said, in such cases, Conservative judges may
have exhibited a libertarian inclination that is not shared as strongly by
their Liberal counterparts. Curiously, the affirmation rate for Mixed
panels was approximately the average of the affirmation rates of the
single-party panels. This indicates that the presence of just one judge
appointed by another political party was sufficient to dampen the trend
that would otherwise be apparent if the panel was entirely made up of
judges appointed by the same party. This finding is consistent with the
dampening trend observed by Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman in their
study of the United States Courts of Appeals.

"

7
This has more to do with the number of observations for Conservative panels and Liberal
panels hearing appeals from dismissals of constitutional challenges to statutes. There were only
seven Conservative panels hearing such cases, and only one Liberal panel, but twenty-one Mixed
panels (of which twenty affirmed the dismissal and only one reversed).
58 Liberal panels overturned acquittals 71% of the time, but there were only seven

observations, making this statistically insignificant.
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Affirmation rates appeared to be statistically significant only
in cases presided over by Mixed panels. This could be a function of an
insufficient number of observations involving such panels. It is also
possible that the data actually reflect Mixed panels' greater tendency
toward maintaining the status quo and deferring to the lower court
decisions; Conservative and Liberal judges may be more inclined to
defer to courts below for the sake of maintaining institutional
cohesiveness. In contrast, for politically homogenous panels, the need
for consensus to maintain good relations may not have been as
pressing.
Cases where gender differences would likely be most
pronounced revealed little variation based on the political composition
of the panels. In criminal cases where there is typically a gender
component (sexual assault and domestic violence), Mixed panels
dismissed sentence appeals by accused persons 74% of the time, while
allowing sentence appeals by the Crowns in such cases 77% of the time.
Also, in family law cases where the male party appealed, the lower court
decisions were affirmed 64% of the time by Mixed panels.
The trend toward deference in private law disputes that was
noted above in Part V(A)(2) persisted despite the political composition
of the panels. All three types of panels affirmed judgments rendered
below in a statistically significant manner: Conservative panels affirmed
65% of the time, Liberal panels affirmed 63% of the time, and Mixed
panels affirmed 64% of the time.
Human rights cases also presented some unexpected results.
Where a claimant was unsuccessful at trial, Conservative panels
affirmed the decision 80% of the time, Mixed panels affirmed 70% of
the time, and Liberal panels affirmed 85% of the time. These results are
quite surprising and, again, somewhat counterintuitive, given that Mixed
panels affirmed at a significantly lower rate than both the Conservative
panels and the Liberal panels. These results point toward the possibility
that a lack of political cohesiveness caused Mixed panels to employ a
different deliberative approach than those composed of all Liberal or all
Conservative appointees. In other words, it may well be that a panel
comprising only judges appointed by one political party tends to have
default norms for certain types of cases, whereas a mixed panel may
result in a more deliberative process.
When we reapplied the Logit procedure using the narrow
categories, there were a few noteworthy results. Overall, the same trends
observed with the broad categories continued to hold. However, in
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contract cases where a claimant was successful at trial, Conservative
panels affirmed the trial judgment 72% of the time, Mixed panels 66%
of the time, and Liberal panels 71% of the time. Again, Mixed panels
seemed to rule differently than homogeneous panels, exhibiting a greater
likelihood to overturn lower court decisions than homogeneous panels.
The only other noteworthy variation with the narrow categories
was in the tort law category. In those cases, where a claimant was
successful at trial, Conservative panels affirmed the judgment 75% of
the time, while Mixed panels affirmed 65% of the time. 5 9 This variation
is somewhat puzzling in a category in which one would expect
differences in political beliefs of the judges to matter very little, if at
all. Again, this may be symptomatic of a difference in the dynamic
that develops between judges, depending on how ideologically
homogenous the panel happens to be. It is quite possible, for example,
that a Liberal appointee may take a more conservative approach to a
case when joined in the panel by Conservative appointees, in order to
serve some unspoken and even subconscious desire to maintain
collegial relations.
C.

Does Gender Matter?

We reapplied the Logit procedure using a variable to indicate
the gender composition of the panels. The panels were classified as
Male, Female,6' or Mixed. Once again, there were a number of
noteworthy results-some expected and others rather surprising. In the
end, these results seem to suggest that, at least in some types of cases,
the gender composition of an appeal panel matters greatly.
Beginning with constitutional law, in cases where a statute was
challenged on constitutional grounds and the trial court dismissed the
claim, Mixed panels affirmed at a higher rate than Male panels-93% of
the time, as compared to 86% of the time. In other words, the presence
of a single female judge seemed to increase, albeit slightly, the
likelihood of the court deferring to a trial judgment dismissing a
constitutional challenge to a legislation.

59 There

was no statistically significant trend observed with respect to Liberal panels.

Given that only 0.51% of panels consisted entirely of female judges, there were insufficient
data to draw any statistically reliable conclusions about the voting behaviour of such panels.
'6
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In contrast, in some categories the gender composition of the
appeal panel did not seem to matter at all. For example, in sentence
appeals by an offender, or in Crown appeals against an acquittal at trial,
the results were entirely consistent in Male and Mixed panels. There was
only slight variation in some other categories. For example, in nonChartercriminal cases where the accused was appealing, Mixed panels
affirmed 59% of the time, while Male panels affirmed 63% of the time.
Similarly, Mixed panels affirmed convictions 70% of the time in cases
where a Charterclaim was rejected at trial, while Male panels affirmed
71% of the time in such cases. Sentence appeals in cases where gender
difference might seem likely, such as sexual violence and domestic
violence cases, actually revealed Mixed and Male panels affirming the
decisions from below at virtually the same rate.
There are other categories, however, where gender composition
seemed to matter greatly. In cases where a Charter challenge was
successfully asserted at trial, Male panels affirmed the result 70% of the
time, while Mixed panels did so 82% of the time. This is a significant
difference, as it means that an individual acquitted at trial via a
successful Charterapplication had a 10% greater chance of having that
acquittal affirmed on appeal when a female judge was on the panel.
In family law cases, where the male party appealed an adverse
ruling, Mixed panels dismissed the appeal 60% of the time, while Male
panels dismissed the appeal 64% of the time. Although a difference of
four percentage points is small, the result suggests that some male
judges may be more sympathetic to female litigants in family matters
than their female counterparts. This provides some empirical grounding
for concern about the possibility of male-on-male gender bias in these
sorts of cases. 6' In other words, some male judges may consciously, or
more likely subconsciously, be influenced by stereotypes regarding the
roles of women and men in family relationships, a risk that strongly
suggests a need for mixed-gender panels in family law appeals.
We reapplied the Logit procedure using our initial set of narrow
categories. This revealed some noteworthy differences in voting patterns
based on gender. To be frank, in some instances, these variations came
in categories of cases where gender differences were entirely
6) For a study suggesting this at the law enforcement stage, see Grant A. Brown, "Gender

as a Factor in the Response of the Law-Enforcement System to Violence Against Partners" (2004)
8 Sexuality & Culture 3.
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unexpected. In this regard, the category that stands out the most
concerns criminal cases where the accused was acquitted through a
Charterremedy. In these cases, Mixed panels sided with the Crown and
overturned the acquittal 73% of the time, while Male panels did so at a
much higher rate of 92%. It is difficult to conceive of a rationalization
for this sort of drastic variation; for some reason, Male panels were
much more likely to overturn in this category of constitutional cases
than they were if a female judge was present.
In sexual assault cases where an accused appealed the sentence,
Mixed panels affirmed the sentence at a rate of 78%, while Male panels
affirmed at a slightly lower rate of 73%. This difference suggests either a
slight bias of female judges against men convicted of these offences or,
alternatively, a slight bias of male judges in favour of the convicted male.
D.

Which Matters More?

Clearly, both the party of appointment and the gender of the
judges appear to influence the voting behaviour of the panel, at least in
certain categories of cases. The next obvious step is to ask which factor
is more powerful. To answer this, we reapplied the Logit procedure with
the party of appointment and gender composition of the panel as
explanatory variables. It should be noted that with the addition of
explanatory variables, the ability of the model to identify which variables
are significant was diminished in some categories where there were too
few observations. Despite these limitations, our finding dos reveal some
notable trends.
Beginning with criminal cases, panels that were mixed both in
gender and party of appointment were highly likely to affirm dismissals
of constitutional challenges to legislation. On sentence appeals, these
panels were also more likely to affirm the penalty imposed by the
sentencing judge. In cases where the Crown appealed an acquittal, the
mixed panels (both in political appointments and gender) overturned
acquittals 68% of the time, while Male panels overturned 71% of the
time. In appeals against conviction, Conservative panels affirmed the
conviction at the rate of 62%, regardless of the gender of the judges.
Yet, gender seemed to matter for panels that were politically mixed
when hearing conviction appeals. For example, politically mixed panels
of all male judges affirmed convictions 65% of the time, while the
presence of just one female judge in a politically mixed panel reduced
that rate to 59%. The observations in these results show that male
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Liberal judges had a slightly higher rate of affirming convictions,
followed by Conservative judges, and then by female Liberal judges.
In cases where an accused was unsuccessful in advancing a
Charterclaim at trial, mixed-gender, mixed-party of appointment panels
affirmed the conviction 68% of the time, all-male mixed-party of
appointment panels of all male judges affirmed the conviction 73% of
the time, mixed-gender Liberal panels affirmed 89% of the time, while
all-male Liberal panels affirmed 86% of the time. Strangely, these
results suggest that in conviction appeals turning on a Charterclaim, the
presence of a female Conservative judge on the panel maximized an
appellant's chances for success. In contrast, Liberal panels, regardless of
their gender composition, were less receptive to Charterclaims. These
results suggest that Conservative appointees in general, and female
Conservative appointees in particular, are more civil libertarian in their
judicial outlook than their Liberal counterparts, and that therefore they
are more receptive to constitutional arguments.
In cases where a Charterclaim was successful at trial and the
charge(s) were dismissed, all-male mixed-party of appointment panels
affirmed the decision 73% of the time, whereas the presence of a female
judge on a mixed-party of appointment panel raised the rate of
affirmation to 80%. In cases where the remedy granted at trial was a stay
of proceedings, mixed-gender panels affirmed the result 26% of the
time, whereas all-male panels did so only 12% of the time. These results
suggest that female judges are more receptive to Charter claims in
criminal cases than their male counterparts.
Family law cases also revealed some noteworthy results. In
cases where the male party appealed, mixed panels (both in party of
appointment and in gender) affirmed the lower court decision 60% of
the time, while all-male mixed-party of appointment panels affirmed
70% of the time. Again, this provides a surprising indication of maleon-male bias in family law cases, at least for panels that are politically
mixed. Of course, this result may have been fuelled by a greater
likelihood of stereotypical thinking by male judges about women and
family life. In family law cases men fared best before all-male
Conservative panels: these panels affirmed adverse ruling against male
litigants only 37% of the time-however, there were too few
observations for this result to be considered statistically significant.
In the human rights category, mixed-gender Conservative panels
affirmed dismissals at trial 86% of the time, while mixed gender, mixed-
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party of appointment panels did so 72% of the time. This suggests that
party of appointment matters in this area while gender does not.
We reapplied the Logit, once again, using the narrow categories,
continuing to measure for the combined influence of a panel's political
and gender composition. Again, in certain categories there were some
noteworthy results.
Beginning with private law cases, all-male Conservative panels
affirmed lower court decisions in contract cases 75% of the time, while
mixed-gender Conservative panels did so 70% of the time. In insurance
cases dismissed at trial, mixed-gender, mixed-party of appointment
panels affirmed the dismissal 64% of the time, while all-male mixedparty of appointment panels did so 79% of the time. Male judges were
more deferential to the trial outcome in insurance cases dismissed at
trial, which suggests a greater tendency on the part of male judges to
favour insurance companies. In negligence cases dismissed at trial,
mixed-gender Conservative panels affirmed the dismissal 85% of the
time, while mixed-gender, mixed-party of appointment panels did so
64% of the time. In summary, in negligence cases, party of appointment
mattered more than gender; by contrast, in insurance cases, gender
seemed to matter more.
Turning to criminal law, there was one noteworthy variation. In
cases where an accused was convicted of an offence against the person.
and appealed, all-male mixed-party of appointment panels allowed the
appeal 30% of the time, while mixed-gender panels did so 40% of the
time. In other words, an accused convicted of a crime of violence had a
slightly better chance of success on appeal when a female judge was on
the panel hearing the appeal.
Collectively, these results seem to suggest that, as between the
two variables, gender may matter more than party of appointment,
although there are exceptions in some categories where party of
appointment was statistically more important. Most interestingly, there
appears to be greater cohesiveness in the decisions of judges of the same
gender than in those from the same party of appointment. This is an
important finding. Nearly twenty years ago, it was an open question
whether the increasing proportion of female judges on our courts would
matter to how cases are decided. At the time, Justice Bertha Wilson was
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strongly of the view that the presence of female judges would indeed
make a difference.62 She explained:
[W]hether you agree or not will probably depend on your perception of the degree to
which the existing law reflects the judicial neutrality or impartiality ... If the existing law
can be viewed as the product of judicial neutrality or impartiality, even although the
judiciary has been very substantially male, then you may conclude that the advent of
increased numbers of women judges should make no difference, assuming, that is, that
these women judges will bring to bear the same neutrality and impartiality. However, if
you conclude that the existing law, in some areas at least, cannot be viewed as the
product of judicial neutrality, then your answer may be very different.6 3

Our results empirically validate Justice Wilson's theory that
female judges would bring a different perspective to the judiciary than
their male counterparts, and that this would serve to influence how
cases are decided, at least in certain areas of the law.
VI.

TRENDS
IN THE
VOTING
INDIVIDUAL JUDGES

BEHAVIOUR

OF

The results above draw no distinction between unanimous
decisions and decisions including dissenting opinion(s). In this part, we
observe the voting behaviour of individual judges as a function both of
party of appointment and gender. Although decisions including a dissent
represented a very small proportion of the court's total case output,
isolating the voting of each judge in every category while also tracking
gender and party of appointment substantially increased the number of
available observations. This analysis reveals that judges of either gender,
appointed by either political party government, seem to exhibit very
similar patterns in their voting, with rarely more than a few percentage
points. distinguishing them. In certain categories, however, there are
some noteworthy differences.
A.

PartyofAppointment and Gender

Beginning with criminal law, in cases where the Crown
appealed an acquittal, Conservative appointees allowed the appeal
77% of the time, while Liberal appointees did so 71% of the time. In

62 See Bertha Wilson, "Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?" (1990)

Osgoode Hall L.J. 507.
63

Ibid at 511.
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cases where an acquittal was obtained via a successful Charterclaim
(ie. exclusion of evidence), Conservative appointees voted to reverse
the decision 82% of the time, while Liberal appointees did so 74% of
the time. In other words, although there were statistical differences in
how judges of different parties of appointment voted (with
Conservative appointees being slightly more likely than Liberal
appointees to overturn acquittals in both categories), there were also
strong similarities. Specifically, both Conservative appointees and
Liberal appointees tended to be more deferential toward acquittals
that resulted from- a trial on the merits than they were toward
acquittals that stemmed from a successful Charterapplication.
Similarly, where charges were stayed because of a Charter
challenge, Conservative appointees overturned acquittals at a rate of
83% (affirming the stay only 17% of the time), while Liberal
appointees overturned at a rate of 74% (affirming the stay 26% of the
time). In contrast, where the Crown appealed an acquittal in cases
involving charges of sexual assault or domestic violence, Liberal
appointees were more likely to overturn acquittals (76%) than their
Conservative counterparts (65%). In short, the influence of party of
appointment varied depending on the subject matter and the appellant
(the Crown or the accused). With allegations that typically involve
female victims and male perpetrators, Liberal-appointed judges were
more likely than their Conservative counterparts to vote against the
accused persons on Crown appeals. In contrast, in Chartercriminal
cases, the influence of party of appointment reversed, with
Conservative appointees being more likely to overturn acquittals on
Crown appeals than their Liberal counterparts. 64
There are other noteworthy results to suggest that party of
appointment does matter, at least in certain categories of cases and with
certain types of litigants. For example, in family law cases appealed by a
male party, Conservative appointees allowed the appeal 43% of the.
time, while Liberal appointees did so 33% of the time. This indicates
that in family law cases, while a female party has an advantage before
judges appointed by either party, a male party's chances of success are
greater (by 10%) when before Conservative appointees rather than
Liberal appointees.
64 The data reported here refer to findings based on the narrower Chartercase categories.

See Table 3a above.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 45, No. 2

Similarly, in human rights cases dismissed below (usually
involving an individual or company seeking judicial review against the
decision of the human rights tribunal), Conservative appointees
affirmed the decision 76% of the time while Liberals appointees did so
70% of the time. In labour law cases where the employee appealed,
Conservative appointees affirmed the decision from below 71% of the
time, while Liberal appointees did so only 67% of the time.
. The voting patterns of male and female judges were, for the
most part, quite similar. That said, there were also some clear
exceptions. For example, in criminal cases where a successful Charter
challenge led to an acquittal, male judges voted to overturn 86% of the
time while female judges did so only 71% of the time. This is a
considerable but somewhat inexplicable difference. Although there are
certain categories of cases where one would expect a judge's gender to
matter, Crown appeals of acquittals following a successful Charterclaim
would not normally spring to mind.
Much more expectedly, the voting patterns of male and female
judges diverged most significantly in cases involving sexual or domestic
violence. In such cases, when the Crown appealed the sentence, male
judges voted to allow the appeal 67% of the time, while their female
counterparts did so 91% of the time. However, when the accused person
appealed the sentence, both male and female judges dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the sentence at the same rate of 70%. Nevertheless,
the differences between the genders surfaced again in this category in
cases where the Crown appealed acquittals entered at trial: male judges
voted to overturn the acquittal 64% of the time, while female judges did
so 85% of the time. Again, the individual voting patterns revealed a
much wider disparity than that which was apparent in panel behaviours
considered in light of gender composition. There is no other category in
this study in which either gender or party of appointment mattered
more. Of all the differences revealed by this study, none is more
pronounced than the difference between male and female judges in
cases involving sexual or domestic violence.
B.

Which Matters More?

We next reapplied the Logit with both gender and party of
appointment as explanatory variables to see which of the two
characteristics influenced the judges' decision making more. Again, a
number of noteworthy trends emerged.

2007]

Does Party of Appointment or GenderMatter?

Beginning with constitutional law, in cases where the
constitutional challenge to legislation was dismissed at trial, female
Conservative appointees voted to affirm the decision 92% of the time,
while male Conservative appointees did so 83% of the time. Male Liberal
appointees voted to affirm such cases 96% of the time, which indicated
that they are either comparatively more skeptical of constitutional
challenges to legislation or more deferential to trial judgments.
Differences in voting patterns were again apparent in criminal
law cases. In some categories of cases, such as those involving sentence
appeals by accused persons, female Conservative appointees, male
Conservative appointees, and male Liberal appointees were all likely to
affirm at closely related rates (61%, 57%, and 56% respectively). In
contrast, in cases where the Crown appealed an acquittal, female
Conservative appointees (77%), male Conservative appointees (71%),
female Liberal appointees (70%), and male Liberal appointees (68%)
exhibited somewhat more noticeable differences in the rates at which
they voted to overturn acquittals. Female Conservative appointees were
the most responsive to Crown appeals, with the differences between the
other three categories of judges being less marked. When it came to
criminal convictions, female Conservative appointees (61%), male
Conservative appointees (62%), and male Liberal appointees (60%) all
voted to affirm convictions at virtually the same rate. In contrast, female
Liberal appointees were the least likely to affirm in these cases, doing so
only 54% of the time.
In criminal cases involving a Charterchallenge that culminated
in the dismissal of the charge(s), female Conservative appointees
affirmed the decision 92% of the time, and male Conservative
appointees did so 72% of the time. Male Liberal appointees affirmed
such cases 84% of the time, suggesting that, at least in this category,
gender and party of appointment can both be important variables. In
cases where a successful Charterchallenge led to a stay of pr6ceedings,
female Conservative appointees overturned the stay 71% of the time
and their male counterparts did so 87.5% of the time; meanwhile,
female Liberal appointees did so 92% of the time and male Liberal
appointees did so 69% of the time. Here, party of appointment and
gender clearly mattered, although in rather surprising ways. For
example, it seems that in cases of stay of proceedings resulting from
Charter challenges, male Conservative appointees and female Liberal
appointees shared similar perspectives, and the same was surprisingly
true of female Conservative appointees and male Liberal appointees.
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Once again, noteworthy differences were apparent in criminal
cases that typically involved male perpetrators and female victims. In
cases where the Crown appealed the sentence in cases of sexual or
domestic violence, female Conservative appointees voted to allow the
appeal 87.5% of the time while male Conservative appointees did so
66% of the time-male Liberal appointees allowed such appeals 72% of
the time, putting them squarely between female Conservative
appointees and male Conservative appointees. Convicted persons who
appealed the sentence imposed for crimes of sexual or domestic
violence were unsuccessful at about the same rate, regardless of the
judge's gender: Conservative appointees affirmed 70% of the time while
Liberal appointees did so slightly more often, 74% of the time.
Differences were also apparent in certain types of private law
cases. In private law cases where a plaintiff appealed the amount of
damages, female Conservative appointees affirmed 76% of the time
while male Conservative appointees did so 63% of the time. Male
Liberal appointees affirmed 69% of the time, again placing them
squarely between their male and female Conservative counterparts.
Female Conservative appointees affirmed private lawsuits that were
successful in the lower court 68% of the time, and male Conservative
appointees did so 62% of the time. Female Liberal appointees and male
Liberal appointees did so 59% and 65% of the time, respectively. Again,
this is an odd breakdown with inexplicable parallels in the voting of male
Conservative appointees and female Liberal appointees, and in female
Conservative appointees and male Liberal appointees. This same
strange trend is again evident in private law cases that were dismissed
below, with female Conservative appointees affirming at a rate of 66%,
male Conservative appointees at a rate of 59%, female Liberal
appointees at 61%, and male Liberal appointees at 64%.
In short, although our analysis reveals that party of appointment
mattered, the gender of the judges mattered more.
C.

Is there a DampeningEffect?

The study by Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman found that, at least
in certain categories of cases, there was a pronounced difference in the
voting of judges based on party of appointment: Democratic or
Republican. This effect was dampened, however, where panels were
composed of judges appointed by both political parties. In other words,
where a panel is made up of two Democratic appointees and one
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Republican appointee (or two Republican appointees and one
Democratic appointee), the judge in the political minority tended to
vote with the other two judges. But the mixed-panel decision tended to
be less ideologically extreme than it would have been if the panel were
composed entirely of judges appointed by a single party. As part of our
study, we decided to test whether such a dampening effect exists at the
Court of Appeal for Ontario.
We reapplied the Logit procedure using the party of appointment
of the judges and the party of appointment of the co-panellists as
explanatory variables. To complete this analysis, we compared the
individual judge's votes in light of his or her party of appointment, with
his or her votes conditional on the co-panellists and the party or parties of
appointment of the co-panellists. Recall from above that in criminal
appeals, Conservative panels overturned acquittals 76% of the time, while
mixed-party of appointment panels did so 70% of the time. Our further
analysis revealed that a Conservative appointee sitting with Conservativeappointee co-panellists voted to overturn 81% of the time, but when
sitting on a mixed panel (i~e. one with at least one Liberal appointee),
only voted to overturn 64% of the time. Similarly, a Liberal appointee
sitting with two other Liberal appointees voted to overturn acquittals 64%
of the time, while a Liberal appointee sitting with Conservative and
Liberal co-panellists overturned 69% of the time.
In cases where a Charterchallenge was dismissed at trial and in
which the accused was convicted, Conservative panels affirmed the
decision 65% of the time, mixed-party of appointment panels affirmed
70% of the time, and Liberal panels affirmed 87% of the time. In
contrast, a Conservative appointee sitting with two Conservativeappointee colleagues voted to affirm 63% of the time, while a
Conservative appointee sitting with one Liberal appointee present on the
panel voted to affirm 68% of the time, and a Conservative appointee
sitting with two Liberal appointees voted to affirm 76% of the time. A
Liberal appointee sitting on a panel of judges made up of all Liberal
appointees affirmed 80% of the time, but only 67% of the time when a
Conservative appointee was present on the panel. In this category,
Conservative appointees tended to dampen the voting behaviour of
Liberal appointees-while the presence of a Liberal appointee did have a
dampening effect on Conservative appointees, it was comparatively less
pronounced.
In short, these differences very strongly suggest that, at least in
some categories of cases, there was a dampening effect at work at the
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Court of Appeal for Ontario. Its impact varied with the composition of
the panels, and it was most pronounced in the behaviour of Liberal
appointees, whose voting was dampened significantly by the presence of
a Conservative appointee on the panel. There Was also a dampening
effect on Conservative appointees voting when sitting with a Liberal
appointee, but to a substantially lesser degree. Again, this did not hold
in all categories of cases. For example, in cases where accused persons
were appealing a conviction, diversity in the party of appointment
among the judges did not have a discernible effect.
In terms of gender, we reapplied the Logit procedure with the
gender of the judge and the genders of the co-panellists as explanatory
variables. Gender again seemed to matter, with a noticeable dampening
effect on its influence with mixed-gender panels. Some of the outcomes
observed are extremely curious and in conflict with our expectations of
when gender might matter.
Beginning with criminal cases in which an accused successfully
asserted a Charterclaim in obtaining an acquittal, mixed-gender panels
affirmed the decision 81% of the time while all-male panels did so 70%
of the time. A female judge sitting with another female judge affirmed
the dismissal 82% of the time, while male judges sitting on all-male
panels did so 72% of the time. Male judges on a panel with a single
female judge, however, voted to affirm 86% of the time, thereby
increasing their rate of affirming lower court decisions above the rate of
their female colleagues.
Cases where one might suspect gender differences to be most
pronounced are cases involving charges of sexual or domestic violence.
Where the charges were stayed at trial in these cases, male judges
sitting with all male colleagues voted to overturn the decision 82% of
the time, while female judges sitting with female co-panellists voted to
overturn the decision at only a slightly higher rate of 86% of the time.65
The number dropped down to 79% when two male judges sat with a
single female judge,6 6 a rate lower than when there were two female
judges on a panel.

" The panel data on this category was not statistically significant enough to make any
meaningful comparison.
' Of course, the comparatively high rate for overturning stays among all panels regardless
of their gender composition is likely a by product of the exceptionally high standard that the
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Unusual patterns also arose in human rights cases dismissed
below. Male judges with all male co-panellists voted to affirm the
dismissal 67% of the time, and female judges with at least one female
co-panellist did so 71% of the time, but male judges with just one female
co-panellist voted to affirm 73% of the time.
The influence of gender diversity was also apparent in labour
law cases and in private law disputes. In labour law cases appealed by an
employee, male judges voted to affirm 73% of the time, and a female
judge sitting with another female judge voted to affirm 66% of the time,
while male judges sitting with one female co-panellist voted to affirm
67% of the time. Similarly, in private law cases dismissed below, male
judges in an all-male panel voted to affirm 55% of the time, while female
judges sitting with another female judge did so 65% of the time, and
male judges sitting with at least one female co-panellist voted to affirm
67% of the time.
These results suggest that there may be a dampening effect that
accompanies gender diversity on appeal panels. The influence of gender
diversity, in some categories, was unexpected, as was the way in which
gender sometimes seemed to matter. Most curiously, as the last few
examples illustrate, on certain issues, the voting of male judges seems to
be influenced considerably by the presence of a single female colleague.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Our study shows a remarkable amount of cohesiveness in the
decision-making of judges on the Court of Appeal for Ontario. In most
circumstances, neither the party of appointment nor the gender of a
judge had any bearing on case outcomes. That said, as it is made
apparent above, there were indeed certain categories of cases where
either or both variables seemed to matter greatly, from a statistical
standpoint. This is a cause for concern.
Our future research will focus on, among other things, the
impact of the judges' background on their voting records. While this
present study examined judges only by their gender and party of
appointment, another study could examine individual judges and their
voting records. Justices Abella and Charron, when they were appointed

Supreme Court of Canada has set down for staying criminal proceedings. See R. v. Regan, [2002] 1
S.C.R. 297.
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to the Ontario Court of Appeal, both voted on certain issues in
discernible patterns. For example, in sentence appeals by the Crown in
cases involving sexual or domestic violence (using the broad categories),
Justice Charron voted over 95% of the time to allow the appeal
(presumably in favour of a harsher sentence), while the justices other than
Justice Charron voted to allow the appeal at an average rate of 69%.
Similarly, when males appealed in family law cases, Justice Charron voted
to uphold the lower court decision 88% of the time, while the other
justices did so at an average rate of 56%. When there was an appeal on a
human rights case that was dismissed below, Justice Charron voted 90%
of the time to affirm the dismissal, while the other justices voted to affirm
the dismissal 70% of the time. When Justice Abella was faced with an
administrative law appeal by a corporation, she voted to affirm the
decision from below 75% of the time, while her colleagues did so 60% of
the time. These results are preliminary, and our future research will
examine the question of the individual judges and the potential influence
of their backgrounds on their decision-making.
To date, at least formally, the party of appointment and gender
of judges on appeal panels were considered irrelevant. This study
demonstrates that this should no longer be the case. As we all know,
judges are human. Despite our best hopes, judges, like all people, bring
their life experiences, including their political perspective and their
gender, with them when they come to work. These are not variables that
judges can, nor arguably should, check at the door. At the same time,
both litigants and the public expect impartial justice. To the extent that
it is possible, judges, on an individual level, and our institutions, on a
systemic level, should strive for objective decision-making. Although this
study empirically confirms that there is good reason for concern, it also
points toward a relatively simple solution.
Put simply, diversity in the political and gender mix of appellate
court panels is essential. With respect to the political composition of the
bench, history has shown that natural cycles in our democratic processes
make it very unlikely that one political party will hold power long
enough to stack the courts.67 That said, despite a fair mixture of judges
appointed by both the Conservatives and the Liberals, it will often
67

Admittedly, in the federal context, there have been some rather long periods of the Liberals
holding power. Our experience over the last twenty-five years, however, suggests that changes in the
governing party are growing more frequent than they may have been in generations past.

2007]

Does PartyofAppointment or GenderMatter?

happen that three judges appointed by the same party sit together on an
appeal panel. This study reveals that when dealing with certain legal
issues-where political ideology would seem to matter-such panels
behave differently than they would if one judge appointed by another
political party had also been on the bench. The same is true with respect
to gender. Again, at least with respect to certain issues where gender
polarization seems most likely, panels composed of all male judges
behave differently than panels that have a single female member.
Our research suggests the need to develop a panel selection
process that deliberately ensures political and gender diversity while also
respecting the wisdom of randomness in assembling the panels. At
present, the Registrar determines the composition of panels at the Court
of Appeal for Ontario. Developing a process that ensures political and
gender diversity on appeal court panels would be an easy task and would
go a considerable distance toward eliminating reasonable perceptions of
bias that this study would now seem to have empirically validated.
Empirical legal research in Canada is in its relative infancy.
Arguably, the most important lesson that emerges from this study is that
long-standing assumptions that currently undergird our legal system are
in need of empirical evaluation. Especially today, when Canada's legal
system is routinely marked with profound changes, often precipitated by
Charterlitigation, we can no longer afford to rest future developments
on unsubstantiated assumptions. It is the job of researchers to infuse
legal and policy debates in Canada with the empirical knowledge that is
required if our institutions are to evolve and mature.68 Gaining that
knowledge and effecting change is essential if we are to have a legal
system of which all Canadians can be proud.

See generally Daved Muttart, The EmpiricalGap in Jurisprudence:A Comprehensive
Study of the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) who makes
this very same point.

